For more than two years, Yahya Sinwar huddled with his top Hamas commanders and plotted what they hoped would be the most devastating and destabilizing attack on Israel in the militant group’s four-decade history.
Minutes of Hamas’s secret meetings, seized by the Israeli military and obtained by The New York Times, provide a detailed record of the planning for the Oct. 7 terrorist attack, as well as Mr. Sinwar’s determination to persuade Hamas’s allies, Iran and Hezbollah, to join the assault or at least commit to a broader fight with Israel if Hamas staged a surprise cross-border raid.
The documents, which represent a breakthrough in understanding Hamas, also show extensive efforts to deceive Israel about its intentions as the group laid the groundwork for a bold assault and a regional conflagration that Mr. Sinwar hoped would cause Israel to “collapse.”
The documents consist of minutes from 10 secret planning meetings of a small group of Hamas political and military leaders in the run-up to the attack, on Oct. 7, 2023. The minutes include 30 pages of previously undisclosed details about the way Hamas’s leadership works and the preparations that went into its attack.
The documents, which were verified by The Times, lay out the main strategies and assessments of the leadership group:
Hamas initially planned to carry out the attack, which it code-named “the big project,” in the fall of 2022. But the group delayed executing the plan as it tried to persuade Iran and Hezbollah to participate.
As they prepared arguments aimed at Hezbollah, the Hamas leaders said that Israel’s “internal situation” — an apparent reference to turmoil over Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s contentious plans to overhaul the judiciary — was among the reasons they were “compelled to move toward a strategic battle.”
In July 2023, Hamas dispatched a top official to Lebanon, where he met with a senior Iranian commander and requested help with striking sensitive sites at the start of the assault.
The senior Iranian commander told Hamas that Iran and Hezbollah were supportive in principle, but needed more time to prepare; the minutes do not say how detailed a plan was presented by Hamas to its allies.
The documents also say that Hamas planned to discuss the attack in more detail at a subsequent meeting with Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader at the time, but do not clarify whether the discussion happened.
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The Israeli military, in a separate internal report obtained by The Times, concluded the documents were real and represented another failure by intelligence officials to prevent the Oct. 7 attack. The Times also researched details mentioned in the meeting records to check that they corresponded with actual events.
The discovery of these records has set off recriminations among Israel’s intelligence agencies. The internal military review of the documents questioned why Israel’s spies failed either to obtain them before Hamas launched its attack or to discern the strategy they describe. While Israel did obtain Hamas’s battle plans before the Oct. 7 attack, Israeli commanders repeatedly dismissed the idea that Hamas had the ability or intention to imminently carry them out.
The Israeli military declined to comment. Hamas and Hezbollah did not respond to requests for comment. Iran’s Mission to the United Nations denied the claims made in the minutes.
“All the planning, decision-making and directing were solely executed by Hamas’s military wing based in Gaza, any claim attempting to link it to Iran or Hezbollah — either partially or wholly — is devoid of credence and comes from fabricated documents,” the Iranian statement said.
Talking in Code
The documents first hint at the operation in January 2022, when the minutes show that Hamas leaders discussed the need to avoid getting dragged into minor skirmishes to focus on “the big project.” Israeli intelligence officers found that Hamas leaders repeatedly used the same phrase in similar contexts, but the officers did not understand what the term meant until reading the documents after the assault, according to two Israeli officials familiar with intelligence about Hamas commanders.
The minutes do not provide a clear list of every person at each meeting, but they state that Mr. Sinwar attended all of the discussions, while his deputy joined at least three. Several military commanders referred to by only their noms de guerre are also listed as having attended.
Israeli intelligence analysts, according to several Israeli officials and the military’s assessment of the documents, concluded that Hamas’s top military leaders, Muhammad Deif, Marwan Issa and Muhammad Sinwar, were among those listed by nickname. The Palestinian analyst with knowledge of Hamas’s inner workings also said he believed the minutes showed Mr. Deif was present.
During a meeting in April 2022, the leaders celebrated how the tensest parts of the Muslim month of Ramadan had passed without major escalation, helping Hamas to “hide our intentions” and “camouflage the big idea (our big project).” They spoke about conserving ammunition and carrying out “a large and convincing disguise and deception process.”
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Gathering in September 2022, the leadership council seemed ready to begin the attack within a month, during the Jewish high holidays, and Mr. Sinwar reviewed the latest battle plans. The documents do not explain why the attack was postponed, but a recurring theme is the Hamas leadership’s effort to enlist support for the operation from Iran and Hezbollah.
Courting Allies
In December 2022, a new far-right government took office in Israel, returning Mr. Netanyahu to power. Hamas leaders noted at a meeting the following month that they needed time to assess the government’s behavior, saying that Itamar Ben-Gvir, a far-right minister known for his provocative actions toward Palestinians, had already made a contentious tour of the Aqsa mosque compound.
The leaders predicted that the actions of the government “will help us with moving toward the big project” by attracting the attention of Hamas’s allies and bolstering support for their attack.
At a meeting in May 2023, Mr. Sinwar and his colleagues expressed relief at having passed another Ramadan without getting sucked into a minor confrontation with Israel, despite tensions at the Aqsa mosque and a brief escalation between Israel and Islamic Jihad.
Once again, they seemed ready to finalize plans for the attack. According to the minutes, the leaders debated whether to launch it on Sept. 25, when most Israelis would be observing Yom Kippur, the most hallowed day in the Jewish calendar, or on Oct. 7, which coincided that year with the Jewish holy day of Simchat Torah. The leaders stressed the importance of avoiding any major escalation with Israel that would upset their final preparations.
“We need to control the behavior of Islamic Jihad and others factions, so that we do not resort to provocations that would ruin our project,” the minutes said. In addition, Hamas would aim to convey the impression that “Gaza wants life and economic growth.”
In the same meeting, the leadership council said they wanted to carry out the attack by the end of 2023 because Israel had announced it was developing a new kind of laser that could destroy Hamas rockets more efficiently than its current air-defense system.
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The minutes also undercut reports of a breach between Hamas’s Gaza leadership and its Qatar-based political leader, Mr. Haniyeh. The minutes show that the leaders shared sensitive information with Mr. Haniyeh, briefed him on “the big project” and decided that of Hamas’s overseas leadership, only he should be informed of meetings that Mr. al-Hayya hoped to hold with Hezbollah and Iran.
The August minutes — the final document seen by The Times — reported that Mr. al-Hayya had told the senior Iranian commander, Mr. Izadi, that Hamas would need help with striking sensitive sites during “the first hour” of the attack.
According to the document, Mr. Izadi said that Hezbollah and Iran welcomed the plan in principle, but that they needed time “to prepare the environment.”
As a result, Hamas’s leaders seemed hopeful that their allies would not leave them “exposed,” but they accepted that they might need to carry out the attack alone. The entrenchment of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, as well as the growing Israeli presence in the Aqsa mosque compound, “can’t make us be patient,” the August document said.
Mr. al-Hayya’s office did not respond to requests for comment, but in an interview with The Times last year, he described the October attack as “a great act” that “woke the world up from its deep sleep.”
In the end, Iran did not directly strike Israel until months after Hamas’s attack, and Hezbollah came to Hamas’s aid only on Oct. 8, after Israel had begun to restore control over its borders. Hezbollah continued to distract the Israeli military from Gaza by firing rockets into Israel. The confrontation led to an all-out war in which Israel assassinated Mr. Nasrallah and other Hezbollah leaders and invaded the group’s strongholds in southern Lebanon.
Hamas was more successful in its efforts to mislead Israel. In the early hours of Oct. 7, Israeli intelligence officers spotted that Hamas fighters had embarked on an unusual maneuver. But they dismissed its significance, concluding that it was a training exercise or a defensive maneuver.
“It is estimated that Hamas is not interested in escalation and entering into a confrontation at the present time,” read a top secret memorandum circulated by intelligence officers at 3:17 a.m., and later reviewed by The Times.
Just over three hours later, the attack began.
Farnaz Fassihi contributed reporting.
View this New York Times Article from October 20th